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Zoning and Land Use Law
Newton M. Galloway*
Steven L. Jones**
The COVID-19 pandemic dramatically affected the world’s economy
and supply chains during this Survey period. 1 However, real estate
development did not cease. In many urban and suburban areas, including
the metropolitan Atlanta area, new development projects rose from the
ground, despite the economic risks and challenges created by the
pandemic. Nevertheless, the long-term impacts of the pandemic may
fundamentally challenge many paradigms that have long sustained
successful real estate development.
Prior to the pandemic, commercial retail developments, such as malls
and destination shopping centers, were already in the economic doldrums
due to the rise of e-commerce and their economic vitality diminished
further as a result of the pandemic. The pandemic forced people to stay
home for work and leisure. Employees utilized technology to work as
efficiently from their homes as they had previously done from their
offices, with the result that business continued despite the pandemic.
While working from home, the same employees shopped online for
everything, from cars to groceries. As a direct result of the pandemic,
technology provided the means for society to learn how to work and shop
without having to travel to traditional brick-and-mortar structures to do
either. Eventually, these employees drove residential development
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further from metropolitan centers, in what is becoming the “work from
home” sprawl.
The impact of these developments is not yet fully known. But, it is
likely that the pandemic will cause fundamental and lasting changes in
all development that society will want or need in the future. Likely, new
residential development (and the commercial development that will
follow it) will drive industrial development and office redevelopment.
These changes will impact future zoning policies and the ordinances local
governments pass to implement them. These changes will also create
new zoning issues that will arise in future Survey periods.
Despite the pandemic, litigation continued, albeit without any of the
in-person components, some of which may never return. The case
decisions, and constitutional and statutory amendments, during the
Survey period fall into four categories:
1. Those questioning whether officials making zoning decisions are
protected from suit in their individual or official capacities by
sovereign and legislative immunity after Lathrop v. Deal,2 particularly
after Georgia voters ratified a constitutional amendment adding
Georgia Constitution of 1983, Article I, Section II, Paragraph V(b),
which waives sovereign immunity in response to Lathrop and its
progeny;3
2. Those continuing the transformation of local government zoning
decisions from legislative acts into quasi-judicial decisions, which
require appeal by petition for writ of certiorari and which superior
courts review under the “any evidence” standard rather than the de
novo review applied to legislate decisions;
3. Those refining Diversified Holdings, LLP v. City of Suwanee;4 and
4. The enactment of section 32-3-3.2 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated, which blurs previously clear lines between (i) who pays for
consequential damages arising from condemnation of real property;
and (ii) the legislature’s generations-old delegation of plenary zoning
power to local government.5

2. 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017).
3. Ga. H.R. Res. 1023, Reg. Sess. (2020) (Ratified in the general election on November
3, 2020).
4. 302 Ga. 597, 807 S.E.2d 876 (2017).
5. O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2 (2021).
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This Article will review decisions and amendments in all of these
categories, addressing those involving sovereign immunity first. 6
I. IMMUNITY ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS
A. Sovereign Immunity Constitutional Amendment
In Lathrop (discussed in prior years’ Surveys), a super-majority of the
Georgia Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity extends to
constitutionally-based claims barring all causes of action against the
state “including suits for injunctive and declaratory relief from the
enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional laws” and bars actions against
local government officials acting within the authority of their official
capacities.7
Applied to a zoning case, Lathrop bars actions against city and county
officials acting within the authority of their official positions, but it allows
a claim to proceed against officials in their individual capacities.8 The
supreme court in Lathrop reiterated that only the legislature or
constitutional amendment may waive sovereign immunity. 9 The
legislature responded in 2019 when both chambers of the Georgia
General Assembly passed House Bill 311 10 with zero “nay” votes.11 HB
6. Other cases of note arising during the Survey period are: Carson v. Brown, 358 Ga.
App. 619, 856 S.E.2d 5 (2021) (holding that discussions with local government officials
regarding development under a zoning ordinance and expenditure of funds in reliance upon
those discussions creates vested rights to develop under the ordinance as it then exists if
the official knew of the developer’s intent to expand said funds); City of Douglasville v.
Boyd, 356 Ga. App. 274, 844 S.E.2d 846 (2020) (accessory use, such as a driveway, must
relate to a principal use permitted in the zoning district); Ham v. City of Milton, 358 Ga.
App. 694, 856 S.E.2d 60 (2021) (sheriff’s delay in serving writ of certiorari did not extend
five day service requirement in O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6(b); There is no safe harbor under O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-4 for service on the defendant-in-certiorari); Wheeler v. Best, 357 Ga. App. 646, 849
S.E.2d 247 (2020) (a bond or a pauper affidavit is a condition precedent to the sanctioning
of a writ for certiorari, and while failure to file the bond is an amendable defect, a petition
for writ of certiorari is subject to dismissal prior to a bond or pauper affidavit defect being
corrected); Cherokee County v. Inline Cmtys., LLC, 356 Ga. App. 892, 849 S.E.2d 703 (2020)
(refining what is (and what is not) a proper annexation versus an impermissible spoke-andstem annexation); Thomas County v. WH Grp. 2, LLC, 359 Ga. App. 201, 857 S.E.2d 94
(2021) (failure to file an application for discretionary appeal with the Georgia Court of
Appeals in a case regarding a “zoning decision” is fatal, resulting in the dismissal of
improper direct appeal).
7. 301 Ga. at 444, 801 S.E.2d at 892.
8. Id. at 422, 434, 801 S.E.2d at 877, 885; see also GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 9.
9. Id. at 419, 801 S.E.2d at 876.
10. Ga. H.R. Bill 311, Reg. Sess. (2019) (unenacted).
11. HB 311, GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/54983
(last visited Sept. 1, 2020).
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311 approved a waiver of sovereign immunity for any claim seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief in an action against a state or local
government official or employee, in their official capacity, challenging
enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute or an unconstitutional
or illegal local government ordinance or action.12
HB 311’s waiver of sovereign immunity would have permitted claims
such as those in Lathrop, and others, which plaintiffs typically assert in
a zoning case against local government officials when the application of
a zoning ordinance or zoning decision allegedly exceeds the officials’
authority or violates the property owner’s constitutional rights. With a
number of caveats, HB 311 would have permitted Georgia citizens to
challenge the unconstitutionality of zoning regulations and decisions by
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against state and local
government officials in their official capacities. 13 But, Governor Kemp
vetoed HB 311.14
In response to that veto, during the 2020 legislative session, the
General Assembly authorized a referendum, permitting Georgia voters
to decide whether the state’s constitution should be amended to waive
sovereign immunity to permit causes of action Lathrop and its progeny
otherwise barred.15 In the November 2020 election cycle, the state’s
electorate ratified a constitutional amendment (the Constitutional
Amendment) creating subsection (b) to Article I, Section II, Paragraph V
of the 1983 Constitution of the State of Georgia. 16 The new amendment
provides as follows:
(1) Sovereign immunity is hereby waived for actions in the superior
court seeking declaratory relief from acts of the state or any agency,
authority, branch, board, bureau, commission, department, office, or
public corporation of this state or officer or employee thereof or any
county, consolidated government, or municipality of this state or
officer or employee thereof outside the scope of lawful authority or in
violation of the laws or the Constitution of this state or the
Constitution of the United States. Sovereign immunity is further
waived so that a court awarding declaratory relief pursuant to this

12. Ga. H.R. Bill 311 at §§ 1-1–2-1.
13. Id.
14. Id.;
see
2019
Vetoed
Legislation,
OFFICE
OF
THE
GOVERNOR,
https://gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/legislation/vetoed-legislation/2019-vetoedlegislation (last visited Sept. 1, 2020).
15. Ga. H.R. Res. 1023, § 1, Reg. Sess.; GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. 5 (showing that the
constitutional provision is much more narrowly tailored than HB 311, which textual
differences (and the political implications therefrom) are beyond the scope of this article).
16. Id.
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Paragraph may, only after awarding declaratory relief, enjoin such
acts to enforce its judgment. Such waiver of sovereign immunity under
this Paragraph shall apply to past, current, and prospective acts which
occur on or after January 1, 2021.
(2) Actions filed pursuant to this Paragraph against this state or any
agency, authority, branch, board, bureau, commission, department,
office, or public corporation of this state or officer or employee thereof
shall be brought exclusively against the state and in the name of the
State of Georgia. Actions filed pursuant to this Paragraph against any
county, consolidated government, or municipality of the state or officer
or employee thereof shall be brought exclusively against such county,
consolidated government, or municipality and in the name of such
county, consolidated government, or municipality. Actions filed
pursuant to this Paragraph naming as a defendant any individual,
officer, or entity other than as expressly authorized under this
Paragraph shall be dismissed.
(3) Unless otherwise provided herein, this Paragraph shall not affect
the power or duty of a court to dismiss any action or deny relief based
on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground or other limitation
on judicial review, including, but not limited to, administrative
exhaustion requirements, ante litem notice requirements, sanctions
for frivolous petitions, standing, statutes of limitation and repose, and
venue. The General Assembly by an Act may limit the power or duty
of a court under this Paragraph to dismiss any action or deny relief.
(4) No damages, attorney’s fees, or costs of litigation shall be awarded
in an action filed pursuant to this Paragraph, unless specifically
authorized by Act of the General Assembly.
(5) This Paragraph shall not limit the power of the General Assembly
to further waive the immunity provided in Article I, Section II,
Paragraph IX and Article IX, Section II, Paragraph IX. This Paragraph
shall not constitute a waiver of any immunity provided to this state or
any agency, authority, branch, board, bureau, commission,
department, office, or public corporation of this state or officer or
employee thereof or any county, consolidated government, or
municipality of this state or officer or employee thereof by the
Constitution of the United States.17

Like most new laws, the constitutional amendment creates many new
questions. Foremost, if a complaint names one or more local (or state)
government officers or employees—in any capacity, individual, official,

17. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, para. 5.
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or both—and asserts claims other than (but in addition to) claims for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, is the entire case subject to
dismissal or are only the officials (in all capacities) subject to dismissal
with respect to only the claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief? Either way, can a plaintiff avoid dismissal if the complaint makes
it clear that the claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief are
asserted solely against the local government, pursuant to the
Constitutional Amendment?
Additionally, zoning applicants on appeal often assert a claim for
attorney’s fees, although such a stand-alone claim is procedurally
improper.18 Nonetheless, and regardless of whether the plaintiff properly
asserts the claim, the instant Constitutional Amendment makes it clear
that a plaintiff cannot recover attorneys’ fees and costs and expenses of
litigation from a local (or state) government in actions for declaratory and
injunctive relief alleging ultra vires or unconstitutional actions (or
inactions) of local, state, or both types of government officers or
employees.19
All noteworthy land use and zoning decisions during the Survey period
preceded the ratification of the waiver of sovereign immunity
Constitutional Amendment. To the extent those decisions involve claims
for declaratory or injunctive relief against government officials for
allegedly unconstitutional or ultra vires actions, courts must now analyze
such claims in view of the Constitutional Amendment. 20
B. Board of Commissioners of Lowndes County v. Mayor & Council of
Valdosta
In Board of Commissioners of Lowndes County v. Mayor & Council of
Valdosta,21 regarding the Service Delivery Strategy Act (the SDS Act),22
the Supreme Court of Georgia faced a unique factual circumstance in
which it held that claims asserted against governmental officers in their
individual capacities were (effectively) asserted against the state and,
thus, barred by sovereign immunity. 23 In other words, the “[s]tate cannot
be the ‘real party in interest.’”24 There, a county board of commissioners
(the BOC) sought declaratory and injunctive (and other) relief against

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

E.g., Brown v. Baker, 197 Ga. App. 466, 467, 398 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1990).
GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, para. 5.
Id.
309 Ga. 899, 848 S.E.2d 857 (2020).
O.C.G.A. § 36-70-20 (2021).
309 Ga. at 899, 848 S.E.2d at 857.
Id. at 899, 848 S.E.2d at 858.
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state agency officials, in both their individual and official capacities, in
response to an action of the agency imposing sanctions on local
governments for failure to meet deadlines under the SDS Act.25
On appeal, the supreme court restated the holding in Lathrop that
although sovereign immunity generally bars claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief, it generally does not do so for such claims against
governmental officers in their individual capacities for allegedly
unconstitutional acts.26 That is because such a suit is one against the
“individual stripped of [their] official character,” as opposed to the
individual officially, and thus, the state.27
Nonetheless, sovereign immunity may still bar a claim against a
governmental official, in their individual capacity, if the state is the real
party in interest because the claim “attempts to control the real property
rights [or] contractual obligations of the State.”28 Just because the claim
seeks to compel a governmental officer or employee to take (or refrain
from taking) action in order to make that officer or employee’s official
actions lawful does not mean the state is the real party in interest. 29
To the contrary, sovereign immunity does not bar a declaratory or
injunctive relief claim that asserts facts alleging “‘unlawful conduct of [a]
public officer[].’”30 Therefore, in Board of Commissioners of Lowndes
County, the court remanded the case for further proceedings to
determine whether the BOC asserted such unlawful conduct by the
agency officers or, instead, whether the state is the real party in
interest.31 After the Constitutional Amendment, the BOC would have
had to name the state agency against which it sought relief and not the
agency officers.

25. Id. at 900–01, 848 S.E.2d at 858–59.
26. Id. at 902–03, 848 S.E.2d at 860.
27. Id. at 904, 848 S.E.2d at 860. (quoting Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Ga. Dep’t of Admin.
Servs., 265 Ga. 215, 220, 453 S.E.2d 706, 711 (1995) (Benham, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), overruled on other grounds by Ga. Dep’t. of Nat. Res. v. Ctr. for a
Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593, 755 S.E.2d 184 (2014)).
28. Id. at 905, 848 S.E.2d at 861.
29. Id. at 904–05, 848 S.E.2d at 861.
30. Id. at 907, 848 S.E.2d at 863 (quoting Ga. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 294 Ga. at 603, 755
S.E.2d at 192).
31. Id. at 908, 848 S.E.2d at 863 (“Neither lower court concluded that dismissal of the
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief was warranted on the basis that the County had
not shown that the State Defendants were acting outside their lawful authority. That is a
question to be decided on remand as the case goes forward”).
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C. Dawson County Board of Commissioners v. Dawson Forest Holdings,
LLC
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Dawson County Board of
Commissioners v. Dawson Forest Holdings, LLC,32 held that sovereign
immunity barred declaratory and injunctive relief claims against
members of the governing authority of the county, its board of
commissioners, in their official capacities.33 However, as Lathrop noted,
sovereign immunity did not bar the declaratory and injunctive relief
claims against the BOC members in their individual capacities. 34
Likewise, legislative immunity, which makes “‘[i]ndividuals acting in
a legislative capacity . . . absolutely immune from suit,’” did not bar the
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims against the BOC
members in their individual capacity because the court reasoned that the
BOC members were only entitled to legislative immunity for decisions
made when they were wearing their “decision maker” hats (that is, when
passing legislation), as opposed to their “enforcement” hats (namely,
when enforcing a current zoning district and its regulations). 35 The court
distinguished between the “legislative” and “enforcement” functions of
BOC members, stating:
The complaints, viewed in Dawson Forest’s favor, . . . allege that the
[members of the BOC] wear two hats—as decision-makers voting on
the rezoning petitions (which for purposes of argument we will refer to
as the “legislative hat”) and as enforcers of already-established zoning
classifications (which we will refer to as the “enforcement hat”).
Dawson Forest’s claims concern the commissioners’ acts while wearing
their enforcement hats, not their legislative hats. The claims seek
nonmonetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief from future
enforcement by the commissioners of the allegedly unconstitutional
zoning classification of its properties—the very type of prospective
remedies that our Supreme Court described in Lathrop . . . .36

The court found that the precedent it analyzed, and the BOC cited,
supported this conclusion.37 Additionally, citing Board of Commissioners
of Lowndes County, the court rejected an argument that sovereign
immunity barred the claims against the BOC members in their

32. 357 Ga. App. 451, 850 S.E.2d 870 (2020).
33. Id. at 454, 850 S.E2d at 874.
34. Id. at 457, 850 S.E.2d at 875–76.
35. Id. at 456, 850 S.E.2d at 875 (quoting Saleem v. Snow, 217 Ga. App. 883, 886, 460
S.E.2d 104, 107 (1995) (physical precedent only)).
36. Id. at 457, 850 S.E.2d at 875–76.
37. Id. at 457–58, 850 S.E.2d at 876 (discussing Lathrop and Goldrush II).
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individual capacities because the BOC members in their official
capacities were the real parties in interest. 38 Like the result in Board of
Commissioners of Lowndes County, the alignment of the parties will be
much different (and much cleaner) after the Constitutional Amendment.
D. Starship Enterprises of Atlanta, Inc. v. Nash—legislative immunity
shields members of local governing authorities, in their individual
capacities, from claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Starship Enterprises of Atlanta, Inc.
v. Nash39 answered a lingering, but troublesome, question after Lathrop
(and Dawson County Board of Commissioners): does legislative immunity
foreclose the ability of a party allegedly aggrieved by a legislative zoning
(or other land use) decision (such as the enactment of a zoning ordinance)
from asserting claims for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding that
decision?40 Were it not for the Constitutional Amendment, the lasting
effect of Starship would be problematic for persons and entities seeking
to appeal adverse local government legislative decisions.
The legislative decision at issue in Starship was an ordinance
amendment regarding “adult establishment[s]” and requiring “sex
paraphernalia store[s]” to obtain a specific license. 41 Starship
Enterprises of Atlanta, Inc. (Starship), challenging the ordinance on its
face, initially sued the local government seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief alleging the ordinance was unconstitutional. Then, the
Georgia Supreme Court decided Lathrop, and Starship dismissed its suit
against the local government. Starship refiled asserting similar claims,
but this time against the members of the governing authority in their
individual capacities.42
The members of the governing authority moved to dismiss the new
complaint asserting that legislative immunity barred the claims against
them in their individual capacities.43 “Under the doctrine of legislative
immunity, members of the General Assembly [and local officials acting
in a legislative capacity] are afforded immunity from ‘any type of legal
action’ brought against them in connection with acts performed by them
in their legislative capacities.”44 The court in Starship held that the
38. Id. at 459–60, 850 S.E.2d at 877.
39. 357 Ga. App. 106, 850 S.E.2d 187 (2020).
40. Id. at 111, 850 S.E.2d at 191.
41. Id. at 107, 850 S.E.2d at 189.
42. Id. at 106, 850 S.E.2d at 188.
43. Id. at 109, 850 S.E.2d at 189–90.
44. Id. at 109, 850 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting Village of North Atlanta v. Cook, 219 Ga.
316, 320, 133 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1963)); see GA. CONST. art. III, § 4, para. 9.
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members of the governing authority “in enacting the [o]rdinance [at
issue], . . . clearly were engaged in core legislative function.”45
If the Constitutional Amendment had not been ratified less than a
month later, Starship would have had implications for challenges to
ordinances facially and rezoning approvals with conditions that an
applicant desired to appeal. In addition to enactment of an ordinance, a
rezoning with or without conditions is, as defined in the Georgia Zoning
Procedures Law,46 a legislative act because it amends the local
government’s zoning map, which is typically incorporated by reference as
a part of the zoning (or unified development) ordinance. 47 If a local
government approved a rezoning application and imposed zoning
conditions unacceptable to the applicant (or zoned the subject property
to a district other than that requested and under which the applicant
could not develop), then the officials making the zoning decision would
be immune from declaratory and injunctive relief in their individual
capacities, due to legislative immunity, and their official capacities under
sovereign immunity.48 As a result, without the Constitutional
Amendment, a zoning applicant would be without a remedy to challenge
the constitutionality of the action. Like the court of appeals noted in
Dawson, “hold[ing] that legislative immunity bar[s] claims for
prospective remedies regarding [an] act . . . would leave [a zoning
applicant] . . . with no recourse against the alleged unconstitutional
zoning classifications” or conditions.49
E. Department of Transportation v. Mixon—sovereign immunity does
not bar an inverse condemnation claim.
Department of Transportation v. Mixon50 reaffirmed that when a state
or local government creates a nuisance, the claim properly sounds in
inverse condemnation.51 That is because the “‘Constitution itself requires

The members of both houses shall be free from arrest during sessions of the
General Assembly, or committee meetings thereof, and in going thereto or
returning therefrom, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace. No
member shall be liable to answer in any other place for anything spoken in either
house or in any committee meeting of either house.
45. Id. at 110, 850 S.E.2d at 190 (citing Schumacher v. City of Roswell, 301 Ga. 635,
638, 803 S.E.2d 66, 69 (2017)).
46. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 (2021).
47. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4) (2021).
48. Id.
49. 357 Ga. App. at 459, 850 S.E.2d at 876.
50. 355 Ga. App. 463, 844 S.E.2d 524 (2020) cert. granted, No. S20C1410,
2021 Ga. LEXIS 53 (Feb. 1, 2021).
51. Id. at 465, 844 S.E.2d at 527.
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just [and adequate] compensation for takings and cannot, therefore, be
understood to afford immunity in [a] case[]” asserting that a local
government creates or maintains “a nuisance which constitutes either a
danger to life and health or a taking of property.”52
Although Mixon pled both a continuing nuisance claim and an inverse
condemnation claim, the trial court and the court of appeals found that
Mixon really only “brought an inverse condemnation claim arising out of
an alleged nuisance to which sovereign immunity is inapplicable.”53 That
is because “the ‘nuisance exception’ [to sovereign immunity] . . . [is] not
an exception at all, but instead a proper recognition that the Constitution
itself requires just compensation for takings and, therefore, cannot be
understood to afford immunity in such cases.”54
II. THE CONTINUING (BUT INCOMPLETE) TRANSFORMATION OF
LEGISLATIVE ZONING ACTS INTO QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Survey articles in prior years reviewed appellate decisions that
commenced the transformation of zoning decisions from legislative acts
into judicial decisions, starting with City of Cumming v. Flowers.55 The
Georgia Supreme Court held that a challenge to a local government’s
denial of a variance must come to superior court by a petition for writ of

52. Id. (quoting Ga. Dep’t. of Nat. Res., 294 Ga. 593, 600, 755 S.E.2d 184, 190 (2014)).
Such a claim is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Id. at 466, 844 S.E.2d at 528.
Whether a nuisance is permanent or continuing often controls whether a landowner can
recover. Id. The line is defined as follows:
The classification of a nuisance as continuing or permanent directly controls the
manner in which the statute of limitation[] will be applied to the underlying
claim. A nuisance, permanent and continuing in its character, the destruction or
damage being at once complete upon the completion of the act by which the
nuisance is created, gives but one right of action, which accrues immediately
upon the creation of the nuisance, and against which the statute of limitation[]
begins, from that time, to run. Where a nuisance is not permanent in its
character, but is one which can and should be abated by the person erecting or
maintaining it, every continuance of the nuisance is a fresh nuisance for which
a fresh action will lie. This action accrues at the time of such continuance, and
against it the statute of limitation[] runs only from the time of such accrual.
Id. (quoting Liberty Cnty. v. Eller, 327 Ga. App. 770, 772–73, 761 S.E.2d 164, 168 (2014)).
Additionally, an inverse condemnation claim does not require an expert affidavit under
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 because “[n]egligence is not . . . a necessary ingredient of a cause of
action growing out of a nuisance [which] may arise through acts and conduct done within
the pale of the law and executed with due care.” Id. at 468, 844 S.E.2d. at 529 (quoting City
of Macon v. Roy, 34 Ga. App. 603, 606, 130 S.E. 700, 702 (1925)).
53. Id. at 465, 844 S.E.2d at 527.
54. Id. (quoting Ga. Dep’t. of Nat. Res., 294 Ga. at 600, 755 S.E.2d at 190).
55. 300 Ga. 820, 797 S.E.2d 846 (2017).
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certiorari56 because it is a quasi-judicial decision.57 The following year in
York v. Athens College of Ministry,58 the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that a decision to grant or deny a special or conditional use permit is also
a quasi-judicial decision, that can be appealed only by a petition for a writ
of certiorari.59 York also precluded the superior court’s consideration in a
certiorari proceeding of any issue raised on appeal that a party did not
first present to the local government in the zoning hearing, indicative of
the “any evidence” rule applied to quasi-judicial decisions.60 The holding
in York was particularly significant because the “grant of a permit
relating to a special use of property,”61 is a “zoning decision” under Zoning
Procedures Law (ZPL),62 which defines such a decision as a “legislative
action.”63
Despite ZPL’s definition, in 2020, the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Riverdale Land Group, LLC v. Clayton County,64 applied three
“characteristics” to define an SUP as a quasi-judicial act: (a) All parties
are entitled to notice, a hearing, and to present evidence as a matter of
right at the hearing; (b) A decision process that is judicial in nature,
ascertaining relevant facts in evidence and the application of preexisting
legal standards to those facts; and (c) A decision that is final, binding,
and conclusive of the rights of interested parties. 65
With these decisions, Georgia’s appellate courts commenced what
seemed to be a methodical march to transform legislative zoning acts into
quasi-judicial decisions. Cases arising during the Survey period
continued the transformation, but they did not complete it.
A. Application of the Riverdale Land Group Factors—City of Rincon v.
Ernest Communities, LLC
Applying the Riverdale Land Group factors the Georgia Court of
Appeals in City of Rincon v. Ernest Communities, LLC, held that the
denials of a site plan and permit applications were quasi-judicial

56. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a) (2021).
57. City of Cumming, 300 Ga. at 825, 797 S.E.2d at 851–52.
58. 348 Ga. App. 58, 821 S.E.2d 120 (2018).
59. Id. at 61, 821 S.E.2d at 123–24.
60. Id. at 64, 821 S.E.2d at 125.
61. Id. at 62, 821 S.E.2d at 124.
62. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4).
63. York, 348 Ga. App. at 61–62, 821 S.E.2d at 124; see also Bentley v. Chastain, 242
Ga. 348, 349 n.3, 249 S.E.2d 38, 40 n.3 (1978).
64. 354 Ga. App. 1, 840 S.E.2d 132 (2020).
65. Id. at 3–4, 840 S.E.2d at 134.
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decisions.66 Ernest Communities, LLC (Ernest) applied for site plan
approval and development permits to construct seventy-eight
townhomes. The city had previously approved a master development
plan, but Ernest applied for development permits pursuant to a modified
version of that plan. The city denied Ernest’s applications, and Ernest
appealed contending (among other things) that the city’s applicable
ordinance was void because the city adopted it in violation of ZPL. Ernest
specifically asserted claims for declaratory judgment and a writ of
mandamus to direct the city to issue the permits. The trial court agreed
with Ernest and granted its motion for summary judgment. The city
appealed.67
On appeal, the city contended that Ernest was required to appeal by
writ of certiorari because mandamus relief is not the proper remedy to
correct a quasi-judicial decision.68 The court of appeals agreed, holding
that the city’s denial of Ernest’s application was a quasi-judicial decision,
satisfying all three characteristics reiterated in Riverdale Land Group.69
Therefore, Ernest could not seek a writ of mandamus and could only
appeal by writ of certiorari. Having failed to appeal by writ of certiorari,
Ernest’s challenge failed, and the court reversed the decision of the trial
court and dismissed Ernest’s complaint.70
B. Application of the “Any Evidence” Rule—Forsyth County v. Mommies
Properties, LLC
Historically, the superior court’s review of a local government’s
legislative zoning act, such as a rezoning, is de novo.71 However, if the
transformation is completed and that legislative zoning action becomes a
quasi-judicial decision which must be appealable by petition for writ of
certiorari72 then the “any evidence” rule applies.73

66. 356 Ga. App. 84, 93, 846 S.E.2d 250, 258 (2020).
67. Id. at 85, 846 S.E.2d at 253.
68. Id. at 90, 846 S.E.2d at 256.
69. Id. at 93, 846 S.E.2d at 258.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 84, 846 S.E.2d at 253.
72. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 (2021).
73. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-12 (2021). See e.g., DeKalb Cnty. v. Bull, 295 Ga. App. 551, 552, 553
n.2, 672 S.E.2d 500, 502 n.2 (2009) (quoting Jamal v. Thurmond, 263 Ga. App. 320, 320,
587 S.E.2d 809, 810 (2003)); Macon-Bibb Cnty. Plan. and Zoning Comm’n. v. Epic
Midstream, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 568, 572, 826 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2019) (physical precedent
only) (“‘Substantial evidence’ under [O.C.G.A. § 5-4-12] has been consistently interpreted
to mean ‘any evidence’”).
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In fact, this was the holding in Forsyth County. v. Mommies Properties,
LLC.74 Mommies Properties, LLC (Mommies) owned 3.92 acres zoned
Commercial Business District under the Forsyth County Unified
Development Code (UDC) located adjacent to (and originally part of) the
Chattahoochee River Club (River Club), a development which contains
600 single-family homes. The River Club developer built a large horse
barn on the property that it ultimately sold to Mommies. The River Club
Property Owners Association (the HOA) enforces covenants restricting
Mommies’ property. River Club residents complained to the county about
severe deforestation, construction noise, land disturbance, and dirt piles
on Mommies’ property. Forsyth County Code enforcement inspected
Mommies’ property and found numerous violations. As a result, the
county issued stop work orders.75
Ultimately, the county required Mommies to submit a soil erosion and
sedimentation plan in order to pile dirt on the property. Mommies
contended that the plan was not necessary and appealed to the Forsyth
County Zoning Board of Appeals (the ZBA). Before the ZBA, Mommies
appeared pro se and did not present any witnesses or tender any
evidence. The county presented a number of witnesses, and Mommies
“was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine each of [them],” but did
not do so. The ZBA denied Mommies’ appeal. Mommies appealed to the
Superior Court of Forsyth County by petition for writ of certiorari, raising
a number of evidentiary issues, among them an allegation that the ZBA’s
decision improperly relied on hearsay evidence. The trial court ruled in
favor of Mommies and reversed the ZBA. 76
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that the trial court
was “bound by the facts and evidence presented to the administrative
body.”77 It noted that Mommies “did not raise any objections with respect
to the application of the evidentiary rules by the hearing officer or the
procedures adopted at the hearing.”78 Mommies contended that “it did
not know that the proceeding would be akin to a ‘trial’ with certain rules
and procedures for admitting evidence.”79 But, the court held that
Mommies “knowingly assumed the risk of appearing before the ZBA
without counsel” and that Mommies had the opportunity to crossexamine the county’s witnesses. The court held that the evidence in the

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

359 Ga. App. 175, 183–84, 855 S.E.2d 126, 134.
Id. at 177–79, 855 S.E.2d 129–31.
Id. at 178–79, 855 S.E.2d at 131.
Id. at 191, 855 S.E.2d at 138.
Id. at 185, 855 S.E.2d at 135.
Id. at 186, 855 S.E.2d at 135.
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record was sufficient to support the ZBA’s denial under the “any
evidence” rule.80 As a result, the court reinstated the ZBA’s decision.81
The hearing process Forsyth County utilized appears (likely following
York) to follow the procedure and format of an administrative hearing in
a “contested case,” defined in Georgia’s Administrative Procedures Act
(the APA).82 The ZBA hearing conducted on Mommies’ appeal differs
significantly from a traditional zoning hearing that most local
governments usually conduct. Even though an appeal from an
administrative decision is not a zoning decision, in such appeals most
jurisdictions use a hearing procedure comparable to that used for
rezoning.83 ZPL provides:
Local governments shall adopt policies and procedures which govern
calling and conducting hearings required by [O.C.G.A. §] 36-66-4, and
printed copies of such policies and procedures shall be available for
distribution to the general public. Such policies and procedures shall
specify a minimum time period at hearings on proposed zoning
decisions for presentation of data, evidence, and opinion by proponents
of each zoning decision and an equal minimum time period for
presentation by opponents of each proposed zoning decision, such
minimum time period to be no less than ten minutes per side.84

An appointed hearing officer presided over Mommies’ appeal to the
ZBA. The hearing included live witness testimony, allowed crossexamination and evidentiary objections, and was presumably
memorialized in a formal written decision. 85
As legislative zoning actions are transformed into quasi-judicial
decisions, parties and practitioners can expect more formal “judicial-like”
procedures in zoning hearings such as the hearing Forsyth County used
in Mommies. The implications of requiring local governments to use
increasingly formal procedures to make decisions that have been
characterized as “legislative actions” will be significant and possibly
impractical. The holding in Mommies involving an appeal from an
administrative decision has traditionally been quasi-judicial.86 However,
these procedures will typify the hearing requirements as zoning hearings

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 189–90, 855 S.E.2d at 137.
Id. at 191–92, 855 S.E.2d at 139.
See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(2) (2021).
See O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5 (2021).
O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5(a) (2021).
Mommies, 259 Ga. App. at 185, 855 S.E.2d at 134–35.
Id. at 191, 855 S.E.2d at 138.
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are transformed into administrative hearings, akin to those that the APA
governs, over which administrative law judges preside.
C. The Next Decision in the Transformation
The decisions in City of Rincon and Mommies consistently followed the
holdings in City of Cumming, York, and Riverdale Land Group, each
moving the transformation of legislative zoning acts into quasi-judicial
decisions forward. However, this transformation will not be complete
until a Georgia appellate court holds that approval or denial of a rezoning
application is a quasi-judicial decision. Couched in the text of ZPL, the
specific issue is whether “[t]he adoption of an amendment to a zoning
ordinance which rezones property from one zoning classification to
another” is a quasi-judicial decision.87 As yet, a court has not so held.
Having earlier discussed the part of the opinion that addressed
sovereign immunity, Dawson County Board of Commissioners v. Dawson
Forest Holdings, LLC is also noteworthy here because the Georgia Court
of Appeals sidestepped the issue of whether a rezoning is a judicial act.88
In 2016, Dawson Forest filed an application to rezone property from
Residential-Agricultural (R-A) to Residential Multi-Family (RMF), as
defined in the Dawson County (County) Zoning Ordinance. The County’s
staff recommended conditional approval, citing consistency of the multifamily housing requested in the application with the County’s
comprehensive plan and future land use map and suitability of the
proposed use with surrounding properties. The Board of Commissioners
(the BOC) denied rezoning. Subsequently, Dawson Forest filed a second
application seeking rezoning for a nearly identical development. In
contrast with its recommendation on Dawson Forest’s first application,
the staff recommended denial. The BOC again denied Dawson Forest’s
second rezoning application. After suffering a second denial, Dawson
Forest appealed the BOC’s decision to Dawson County Superior Court. 89
As noted earlier, Dawson Forest’s complaint included claims for
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus directing the
BOC to rezone the property. It included allegations against the county
commissioners, in their official and individual capacities. The trial court
held that sovereign immunity barred Dawson Forest’s claims against the

87. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(C) (2021). See O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(D) (2021) (identifying “[t]he
adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance by a municipal local government which
zones property to be annexed into a municipality” as a zoning decision, though the act of
annexation is not and therefore, annexation and rezoning are separate functions).
88. Dawson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 357 Ga. App. at 456, 850 S.E.2d at 875.
89. Id. at 453–54, 850 S.E.2d at 872–73.
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BOC members officially, but the claims alleged against them individually
could proceed.90
The BOC members contended that legislative immunity barred the
claims Dawson Forest asserted against them individually, citing
Diversified Holdings. Specifically, Dawson Forest quoted Diversified
Holdings for the proposition that “a rezoning decision affecting a
particular piece of property may no longer be considered a legislative
act.”91 The court noted that Diversified Holdings’s statement regarding
rezoning decisions was made in the context of the test for “determining
the proper procedure for seeking appellate review,” which is a different
test from that discussed below.92 Instead of reconciling the tests, the
court sidestepped the issue stating:
We need not resolve that issue, however, because assuming the [BOC
members’] votes against rezoning the properties were legislative acts,
the [BOC members] are not entitled to legislative immunity in th[is]
case[]. This is because Dawson Forest’s claims do not arise from the
[BOC members’] past votes on the properties’ zoning classifications.
Instead, its claims for declaratory and injunctive relief arise from the
[BOC members’] anticipated future enforcement of allegedly
unconstitutional zoning classifications.93

As noted earlier, the court distinguished between the actions of the
BOC members based on whether they wore “legislative” or “enforcement”
hats at the time of their action. 94 Since the BOC members offered “no
persuasive argument that the enforcement” of a zoning classification is a
legislative act, the court held that the county commissioners wore their
“enforcement” hats as they continued to apply (or enforce) the allegedly
unconstitutional zoning classification applied to Dawson Forest’s
property that prevented the development of multi-family housing.95 As
also noted above, the BOC members cited Lathrop to assert that
sovereign immunity barred the claims against them in their individual
capacities.96
The court of appeals disagreed.97 Viewing the complaint most
favorably to Dawson Forest on a motion to dismiss, the court reasoned:

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 454, 850 S.E.2d at 873.
Id. at 457, 850 S.E.2d at 875.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 457, 850 S.E.2d at 875–76.
Id. at 458–59, 850 S.E.2d at 876.
Id. at 459–60, 850 S.E.2d at 877.
Id. at 456, 850 S.E.2d at 875.
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Were we to hold that legislative immunity barred claims for
prospective remedies regarding the act of enforcement, that would
leave Dawson Forest with no recourse against the allegedly
unconstitutional zoning classifications. Our Supreme Court has
recognized that courts have a role in considering the constitutionality
of zoning decisions. We decline to apply legislative immunity in a way
that would foreclose such consideration.98

The court of appeals allowed Dawson Forest’s claims against the
commissioners, individually, to proceed.99
The holding in Dawson Forest was plainly result-driven. Dawson
Forest presented the court with facts evidencing the County’s disregard
of the prospective planning policies it adopted in its comprehensive
plan.100 Dawson Forest applied to rezone its property to a multi-family
classification twice. The County’s staff recommended approval of the first
application based on the County’s comprehensive plan and future land
use map, as well as compatibility of the development with nearby
properties. Though the County’s comprehensive plan did not change and
there was no substantive difference between the applications, the staff
recommended denial of the second application. The BOC denied each
application.101
Further, Dawson Forest did what local governments and planners (in
particular) want developers to do: review the County’s comprehensive
plan prior to development and propose development that is consistent
with the plan. In sum, the County implemented a comprehensive plan
which anticipated development of multi-family dwellings on Dawson
Forest’s property, but it did not follow it. Ultimately, the County lost the
case because it failed to comply with its own future land development
policies or (at a minimum) explain its deviation from them. 102
The court of appeals’ “two hat” distinction—between legislative and
enforcement actions—provided a remedy to Dawson Forest to protect its
proposed development from a potentially arbitrary and capricious denial
by the BOC, which failed to follow its existing development and zoning
policies set forth in its comprehensive plan.103 The court of appeals
stretched to allow Dawson Forest’s suit to proceed before enforcement

98. Id. at 459, 850 S.E.2d at 876 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 460–61, S.E.2d at 877–78.
100. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, DAWSON COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN 2013–33 (2013), https://www.dca.ga.gov/sites/default/files/dawson_county_comp_
plan_update_2013_0.pdf.; see O.C.G.A. § 36-70-3 (2021).
101. Dawson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 357 Ga. App. at 453–54, 850 S.E.2d at 873.
102. Id. at 453, 850 S.E.2d at 873.
103. Id. at 457, 850 S.E.2d at 875–76.
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even commenced.104 To reach this result, the court of appeals had no
choice but to reaffirm that a rezoning decision is still a legislative act, not
a quasi-judicial decision.105 The decision in Dawson Forest appears to be
a detour on the road to transform a legislative rezoning act into a judicial
decision. The question of whether Georgia’s appellate courts will hold
that the approval or denial of a rezoning application is a quasi-judicial
decision will have to wait.
III. REFINEMENT OF DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS, LLP V. CITY OF SUWANEE
In 2017, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Diversified Holdings, LLP
v. City of Suwanee106 that a taking of property through inverse
condemnation from a zoning regulation action cannot occur unless “the
owner was completely deprived of the use of the property.”107 It noted
(citing supporting federal authorities) 108 that a takings claim resulting
from a zoning regulation is inconsistent with the theory of inverse
condemnation and that “[u]nder a true takings challenge . . . ‘the focus of
the takings analysis is on whether the government act takes property,
not on whether the government has a good or bad reason for its action.’”109
Zoning, the supreme court continued, “does not ordinarily present the
kind of affirmative public use at the expense of the property owner that
effects a taking,” and it is unlikely to be “fertile ground” for inverse
condemnation claims.110 To reach its decision, the supreme court
distinguished eminent domain from the exercise of the government’s
regulatory police power, such as zoning and land use restrictions.111
During the Survey period, two cases refined what Diversified Holdings
means in practice.
A. D. Rose, Inc. v. City of Atlanta—For a taking to occur, the challenged
regulation must be the only reason the property does not have an

104. Id. at 460–61, 850 S.E.2d at 877–78.
105. Id. at 457, 850 S.E.2d at 875.
106. For an analysis of Diversified Holdings during the 2018 Survey period, see Newton
M. Galloway & Steven L. Jones, Zoning and Land Use Law, Georgia Survey, 70 MERCER L.
REV. 301 (2018).
107. 302 Ga. at 608, 807 S.E.2d at 886.
108. Id. at 606–07, 807 S.E.2d at 885 (first citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 617 (2001); then citing Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1951 (2017); and then citing
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
109. Id. at 609–10, 807 S.E.2d at 887.
110. Id. at 610, 807 S.E.2d at 887–88.
111. Id. at 605–06, 807 S.E.2d at 884–85.
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economically viable use.
In D. Rose Inc. v. City of Atlanta, D. Rose, Inc. (D. Rose) 112 acquired a
1.17 acre residentially zoned parcel within the City of Atlanta (the City)
bisected by a creek. The rear portion of the property was encumbered
with a floodplain and sewer easements rendering two thirds of the
property unbuildable. Additionally, the applicable zoning district and
regulations required a sixty-foot front yard setback. D. Rose sought a
variance from the front-yard setback, alleging that the restriction
constituted a regulatory taking without just and adequate compensation.
The City denied the variance. D. Rose appealed via petition for writ of
certiorari. The Fulton Superior Court dismissed the petition. And the
Georgia Court of Appeals granted D. Rose’s application for discretionary
appeal.113
The court recited the reasoning of Diversified Holdings and its federal
muse, Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City.,114
framing its analysis of the taking claim.115 The court of appeals then
announced a takings analysis must focus on whether the challenged
regulation completely deprives the property of all beneficial economic
uses.116 To do so, the court declared that a takings analysis must focus on
the “‘property as a whole.’”117 Through this lens, the court found that
“[w]hile the setback requirement together with these other
encumbrances may effectively deprive [D. Rose] of all use of the property,
the setback requirement is not, by itself, the reason that all of the value
of the property’s beneficial economic use has been depleted.”118
Considering D. Rose, it is rare that a zoning requirement will amount
to a taking of property. This case shows that the predictions after
Diversified Holdings are true: most owners of property, in Georgia,
encumbered by zoning regulations that effectively render their property
undevelopable do not have a claim for a regulatory taking. As a result,
Georgia property owners are left with appealing denials to superior court.
As discussed in previous surveys, the appeal process for legislative
decisions (which are all but confined to decisions solely amending a
zoning ordinance or rezoning property) and quasi-judicial decisions
(generally, all other decisions, such as variances and special use permits
112. 359 Ga. App. 533, 534, 859 S.E.2d 514, 515 (2021).
113. Id. at 533–34, 859 S.E.2d at 515.
114. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
115. D. Rose, 359 Ga. App. at 535, 859 S.E.2d at 515–16.
116. Id. at 536, 859 S.E.2d at 516–17.
117. Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l. Plan. Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 327 (2002)).
118. Id. at 537, 859 S.E.2d at 517.
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which are also called conditional use permits) are diametrically different.
Appeals of legislative decisions are tried de novo. And naturally,
quasi-judicial decisions are appealed with the superior court sitting as an
appellate court applying a standard that asks whether any evidence
supported the local government’s decision.
B. Appellate Practice—Clay v. Douglasville-Douglas County Water and
Sewer Authority–an inverse condemnation claim in response to a
local government’s decision on a zoning request is an appeal of a
local administrative agency’s decision that requires an application
for discretionary appeal to the court of appeals.
In Diversified Holdings, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a
rezoning application was a “zoning decision” that appellants must appeal
to the court of appeals via an application for discretionary appeal under
section 56-6-35(a)(1) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. 119 But,
the court in Diversified Holdings made that decision pretermitting
whether an appeal from a true inverse condemnation proceeding would
require a discretionary application.120
In Clay v. Douglasville-Douglas County Water and Sewer Authority,
the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an inverse condemnation claim
asserted against application of a development regulation promulgated by
a local water and sewer authority constituted a decision of a local
administrative agency.121 This is similar to a “zoning decision” under
Schumacher v. Roswell,122 that can only be appealed to the court of
appeals via an application for discretionary appeal under O.C.G.A.
§ 56-3-35(a)(1).123
The test of whether a superior court’s order on a local government or
authority’s decision related to zoning or land use requires an application
for discretionary appeal to the court of appeals (on its face) is simple: ask
whether the initial decision giving rise to the suit is adjudicative in
nature.124 If the answer is in the affirmative, then an appeal from the
superior court’s order must be by application for discretionary appeal to
the court of appeals; if it is in the negative, the appeal may be direct. 125

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

302 Ga. at 605, 807 S.E.2d at 884.
Id.
357 Ga. App. 434, 436–37, 848 S.E.2d 733, 736 (2020).
301 Ga. 635, 803 S.E.2d 66 (2017).
Clay, 357 Ga. App. at 436–37, 848 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 436, 848 S.E.2d at 736.
Id.
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A finding that a decision is adjudicative does not rest on the decision
maker’s required procedure.126
Instead, a decision is adjudicative if it is particular, immediate, and
specific in application and involves “assessment of facts about the parties
and their activities, businesses, and properties,” rather than, as in the
case of a legislative or rule making action, general and prospective in
effect and “‘marked by a general factual inquiry that is not specific to the
unique character, activities[,] or circumstances of any particular
person[.]’”127 Thus, if “the [would-be] appellant has already been heard in
two tribunals on the relevant issues, once by the [local] administrative
agency and once by the superior court,” an application for discretionary
appeal is required.128
The purpose of § 5-6-35 is clear: “‘to give the appellate courts the
discretion not to entertain an appeal where the superior court had
reviewed a decision of certain specified lower tribunals (i.e., two tribunals
had already adjudicated the case).’”129 The treacherous path lies in the
way the application for discretionary versus direct appeal (in the court of
appeals) test compares with the writ for certiorari versus direct appeal
(in superior court) test. In the former instance, a rezoning is
“adjudicative” (in other words, quasi-judicial) in nature because it
involves a particular piece of property and is prospective in nature. 130 In
the latter test, a rezoning decision is legislative in nature because the
Georgia Zoning Procedures Law says so. 131 As noted in prior surveys, this
is a potential tripwire of which land use and zoning practitioners must
be weary.
IV. O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2: THE INTERSECTION OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND
THE HOME RULE ZONING POWER—UNANSWERED QUESTIONS.
During the 2020 legislative cycle, the Georgia General Assembly
passed House Bill 1098, which created a new statute codified at O.C.G.A.

126. Id. (citing State v. Int’l Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 299 Ga. 392, 401,
788 S.E.2d 455, 463 (2016)).
127. Id. (quoting Int’l Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 401, 788 S.E.2d at 463).
128. Id. at 438, 848 S.E.2d at 737 (citing Diversified Holdings, 302 Ga. at 603–04, 807
S.E.2d at 883).
129. Id. at 438, 848 S.E.2d at 737–38 (quoting Ladzinske v. Allen, 280 Ga. 264, 265, 626
S.E.2d 83, 85 (2006)).
130. Id. at 436–37, 848 S.E.2d at 736.
131. Id.
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§ 32-3-3.2.132 That statute, which provides as follows, leaves many
questions regarding its practical effect unanswered:133
When rights of way or real property or interests therein are acquired
or condemned by a state agency, county, or municipality for public road
purposes and a documentation of a conflict has been issued to a
property owner, the local jurisdiction shall:
(1) Grant a minimum degree of variance from land use or land
disturbance permitting standards for the remaining parcel to the
property owner or any successor in interest. Such variance shall be
granted upon satisfactory production of proof of the transfer of title of
the acquired or condemned property or interests in property to the
condemning authority and the documentation of a conflict; provided,
however, that application for any such variance has been made no
later than five years after the transfer of property or interests in
property; or
(2) Provide to the property owner or any successor in interest just and
adequate compensation for damages related to a conflict with local
land use ordinances or regulations as identified by documentation of a
conflict and upon denial of a variance sought pursuant to paragraph
(1) of this subsection; provided, however, that no compensation shall
be paid either directly or indirectly by the acquirer or condemnor.134

A “documentation of a conflict” is a document produced by the
condemning government or “authority to a property owner revealing a
proposed cure for an alleged damage that resulted as part of a
condemnation or from acquisition through negotiations . . . [that] would
result in a violation of a local government land use ordinance or land
disturbance regulation.”135
The first and most important issue is the conflict between this statute
and the home rule zoning power of local governments. Arguably, this
statute constitutionally usurps the local zoning power. The Georgia
Constitution bestows upon the governing authority of each local
government the power to “adopt plans and . . . exercise the power of
zoning.”136 Likewise, the General Assembly often reiterates that power
132. Ga. H.R. Bill 1098, Reg. Sess. (2020) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2).
133. Christian Torgrimson & Ellen Smith, New Law Creates Uncertainty for Georgia
Property Owners and Local Governments, DAILY REPORT (Jul. 19, 2021),
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2021/07/19/new-law-creates-uncertainty-forgeorgia-property-owners-and-local-governments/ (last accessed Aug. 1, 2021).
134. O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2(b) (2021).
135. O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2(a)(3) (2021).
136. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4.
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in municipal charters.137 Despite this delegation of power, the Georgia
Constitution, however, does “not prohibit the General Assembly from
enacting general laws establishing procedures for the exercise of such
[zoning] power.”138
Procedural laws are different from laws usurping the zoning power of
local governments. To that end, the Georgia Supreme Court, when
interpreting an analogous constitutional predecessor to Article IX,
Section II, Paragraph IV of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of
1983, regarding the home rule power of local governments, declared that
“[i]t was the intent of the General Assembly in submitting [to the voters
the constitutional] amendment that the legislature, upon its ratification,
would no longer have the authority to enact local laws concerning
planning and zoning,” and that the sole authority to do so would be vested
in the local governments of the state.139
In contrast to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2, ZPL is a procedural law that
governs how local governments must consider certain zoning requests. 140
ZPL requires with respect to those zoning requests (among other things)
a public hearing, public notice of that hearing, and an opportunity for the
applicant and the public to be heard. 141 ZPL does not bind the local
government to take any particular action on any zoning request.142 For
that reason, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Northridge Community
Association, Inc. v. Habersham at Northridge,143 held to be permissible a
now-repealed zoning procedures law because it was “strictly procedural,
neither b[ou]nd the local government in any way nor infringe[d] on its
ability to ‘exercise the power of zoning[.]’ . . . [that law, like ZPL,]
therefore . . . d[id] not exceed . . . constitutional authorization.”144
In contrast, O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2 could require a local government to
grant a “minimum degree variance” and, therefore, may
unconstitutionally infringe on local governments’ exclusive ability to
exercise the power of zoning.145 Consequently, the General Assembly, in
enacting O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2, arguably impermissibly enacted a law

137. See O.C.G.A. §§ 36-35-3(a), 70-3(1)–(3) (2021); see also, e.g., ALPHARETTA, GA.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES art. I, § 1.13 (2021); 1981 Ga. Laws (Act No. 704), 4609, 4613 (City
of Alpharetta, Georgia, City Charter Section 1.13 (14)).
138. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4.
139. Johnston v. Hicks, 225 Ga. 576, 580–81, 170 S.E.2d 410, 413 (1969).
140. E.g., O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4 (2021).
141. Id.
142. See O.C.G.A. § 36-66-2 (2021).
143. 257 Ga. 722, 363 S.E.2d 251 (1988).
144. Id. at 724, 363 S.E.2d at 253.
145. See id.
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inconsistent with the Georgia Constitution, in violation of Paragraph I,
Section VI, Article III of the same constitution. 146
Additionally, the statute is not clear on what is a “minimum degree
variance.”147 For example, if a documentation of a conflict shows that a
complete variance must be granted (in other words, that the requirement
under the applicable zoning or development ordinance must be
completely, as opposed to partially, eliminated for the subject property),
then is that a “minimum degree variance”? Or does the statute seek to
limit the degree of variance that must be granted so that local
governments can retain the spirit of the regulation sought to be varied?
The statute may also create conflicts between different departments,
boards, or commissions within a local government if the local government
is both the condemning or acquiring entity and the local government
vested with the zoning power.148 Additionally, many property owners
may have prepared plans showing cures from takings or acquisitions and
claim that they constitute “documentation[s] of a conflict.”149 The plain
language of the statute appears to indicate that under such a scenario an
owner-produced documentation would not suffice to trigger application
of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2, but the question remains.150 Does the word
“degree” prevent a local government from granting a “minimum degree
variance” subject to conditions of approval? If an ordinance does not have
an explicit variance provision regarding the conflicting regulation, does
the statute empower a local government to grant what in other
circumstances would be a procedurally improper variance? And, if the
local government refuses to grant a “minimum degree variance”, what
action does the applicant file to force the local government to pay “just
and adequate compensation”? One thing is for certain: litigation will
abound over O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2.

146. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 1 (“The General Assembly shall have the power to
make all laws not inconsistent with this Constitution . . . .”).
147. O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3.2.
148. See Torgrimson & Smith, supra note 133.
149. See Ga. H.R. Bill 1098, supra note 132.
150. See Torgrimson & Smith, supra note 133.

